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The state-of-the-art and practice show an increased recognition, but limited adoption, of Behavioural Evidence Analysis (BEA) 
within the Digital Forensics (DF) investigation process. Yet, there is currently no BEA-driven process model and guidelines for 
DF investigators to follow in order to take advantage of such an approach. This paper proposes the Behaviour l Digital Forensics 
Model to fill this gap. It takes a multidisciplinary approach which incorporates BEA into in-lab investigation of seized devices 
related to interpersonal cases (i.e., digital crimes involving human interactions between offender(s) and victim(s)). The model 
was designed based on the application of traditional BEA phases to 35 real cases, and evaluated using 5 real digital crime cases - 
all from Dubai Police archive. This paper, however, provides details of only one case from this evaluation pool. Compared to the 
outcome of these cases using a traditional DF investigation process, the new model showed a number of benefits. It allowed a 
more effective focusing of the investigation, and provided logical directions for identifying the location of further relevant 
evidence. It also enabled a better understanding and interpretation of victim/offender behaviours (e.g., probable offenders’ 
motivations and modus operandi), which facilitated a more in depth understanding of the dynamics of the specific crime. Finally, 
in some cases, it enabled the identification of suspect’s collaborators, something which was not identifi d via the traditional 
investigative process. 
 
Keywords: Behavioural Evidence Analysis; reconstruction of digital crime; digital forensics investigation; behavioural digital forensics model; 
digital evidence interpretation.
1. Introduction 
The utility of Behavioural Evidence Analysis 
(BEA) has gained attention in the field of Digital 
Forensics (DF) in recent years  (Casey, 2011b, 
Rogers, 2015, Rogers and Seigfried-Spellar, 2014, 
Silde and Angelopoulou, 2014, Turvey, 2011a). It has
been recognised that in some types of digital crime, 
along with the technical examination of digital 
evidence, it is beneficial for the investigation to
examine behavioural clues related to offender/victim 
activities present in the digital evidence (Casey, 
2011b, Rogers, 2015, Turvey, 2011a). This can assist 
the investigator1 in producing a better justified and 
more coherent reconstruction of the crime, in 
interpreting associated digital evidence, and in the
 
1 The terms “investigator” and “practitioner” are used 
interchangeably to refer to the person conducting the 














description of investigative findings (Al Mutawa et
al., 2015, 2016). 
Previous studies have demonstrated that BEA has 
applicability and utility when integrated within the 
DF investigation process in a post-mortem 
examination, analysis, and interpretation of the 
digital evidence for specific types of digital crimes 
(Al Mutawa et al., 2015, 2016). These benefits 
include focusing and speeding up the investigation, 
inferring victim/offender behaviour, inferring 
offender motivation, identifying potential victims, 
and eliminating suspects.  
Despite the identified utility of BEA, there is no 
DF process model that provides clear, explicit, and
comprehensive steps for “how” it can be performed 
within the DF investigation process. The available 
literature only provides a general explanation of the
strategies of BEA, and its claimed utility in 
investigating digital crimes (Rogers, 2003, Rogers, 
2015, Turvey, 2011a).  
This paper aims to address this identified gap in 
the literature in three ways. Firstly, it focuses on
integrating BEA within the DF investigation process 
during the in-lab examination, analysis, and 
interpretation of the data contained within digital 
devices associated with the case under investigation. 
The multidisciplinary approach of this work will 
advance DF state-of-practice by incorporating the 
stages of BEA into current DF process models to 
develop a new framework which provides more 
specific detail about the required strategies in each 
phase. Secondly, it employs an empirical 
methodology to develop the proposed model based 
on two empirical studies that examined the utility and 
applicability of BEA on thirty five real digital crime 
cases related to cyberstalking and the possession and 
dissemination of Indecent Images of Children (IIOC), 
obtained from the Dubai Police (Al Mutawa et al., 
2015, 2016). Finally, it evaluates the proposed model 
using a case study of a real digital crime case related 
to online impersonation and defamation. This was 
selected from a pool of five digital crime cases 
involving human interactions between offender(s) 
and victim(s) also used for evaluation, but not 
explicitly reported in this paper. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 
provides background information about criminal 
profiling and the claimed benefits of BEA in 
investigating digital crimes. Section 3 identifies the 
general limitations of previously developed DF 
process models, and critically reviews two specific 
models that incorporate aspects of BEA. Section 4 
describes the methodology used to develop the 
proposed behavioural DF model, and section 5 
describes its design and different phases. Section 6 
uses the case study to evaluate it. Sections 7 and 8 
discuss the model’s benefits and limitations, 
respectively, and section 9 presents the conclusions. 
2. Background 
This section provides a brief overview of the 
history of criminal profiling, and how it relates to he 
development of BEA. 
2.1. Criminal profiling 
Criminal profiling is a forensic technique used in 
criminal investigation for analysing, assessing, and 
interpreting the physical evidence, the crime scene, 
the nature of the offence, and the way it was 
committed (Ainsworth, 2013, Douglas et al., 1986, 
Kocsis, 2006). This aims to create a profile of the
demographic and behavioural characteristics of an 
offender based on known characteristics of those who 
have previously committed similar crimes (Kirwan, 
2011, Kocsis, 2006). It offers two distinct strategies 
for creating a subject profile: inductive and deductive 
approaches. Inductive profiling utilises statistical 
analysis of behavioural and psychological data from 
convicted criminals to identify a generalised 
behavioural pattern and personality traits of a typical 
offender in specific types of cases (e.g., rape, serial 
murder) (Rogers, 2003, Warikoo, 2014). The 
investigator then uses criminal databases or records 
related to the defined characteristics to identify a 
group of potential suspects (Rogers, 2003). 
Deductive profiling, on the other hand, relates to 
case-based investigations. It analyses evidence from
the case in question, focusing on identifying specific 
behavioural and personality traits in order to develop 
a profile of the specific characteristics of the suspect 
(Turvey, 2011a, Warikoo, 2014). 
2.2. Behavioural Evidence Analysis 
Behavioural Evidence Analysis (BEA) is a 
deductive, case-based investigative approach that 
analyses evidence from a specific case to identify the 
specific behavioural and personality characteristics of 
the suspect (Turvey, 2011a). It uses the forensic 
evidence available for a case to understand and 
reconstruct the behaviour of a criminal. This 
approach consists of four types of analysis: equivocal 
forensic analysis, victimology, identification of crime 
scene characteristics, and identification of offender 
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Equivocal forensic analysis refers to the process of 
conducting a scientific assessment of the case details 
that includes a thorough examination, analysis, and 
evaluation of digital evidence, employing critical 
thinking, reasoning, and logical analysis (Casey and
Turvey, 2011, Turvey, 2011a). Victimology refers to 
the thorough scientific study of victims’ 
characteristics, daily routines and lifestyle that may 
have contributed to their selection (Casey and 
Turvey, 2011, Karmen, 2012). Examining crime 
scene characteristics requires an identification of the 
unique aspects of the digital crime scene, which can 
answer questions regarding the case, uncover further 
evidence, and reflect the offender’s behavioural 
decisions (Turvey, 2011a). In the final stage, offend r 
characteristics are identified based on the results of 
the preceding stages of the analysis in order to 
specify the behavioural traits of the suspect (Turvey, 
2011a). 
2.3. The Role of BEA in Investigating Digital Crimes 
Research has recognised that behavioural analysis 
of digital data can benefit the investigation of certain 
types of digital crimes by developing a more 
effective understanding of the individuals involved in 
the offence (i.e., offenders and victims), as well as 
the dynamics of the crime (e.g., Colombini et al., 
2012, Nirkhi et al., 2012, Rocha et al., 2017). The 
analysis of this data can also provide investigators 
with information about offender motivations, and 
their relationship to the victim (Casey, 2011a, Smith 
and Shuy, 2002). The use of specific words and the 
tone of language used in communications can also 
reveal the psychological state of the offender (e.g., 
anger, revenge, greed) (Douglas et al., 1986, Kaati et 
al., 2016). Analysing files from their computer (e.g., 
Internet history files, recently accessed files, access 
dates of files, deleted files) can reveal indicators f 
suspicious activity, as well as signature behaviour 
and personalised characteristics of the offender 
(Rogers, 2003). This helps the investigator to develop 
leads, and determine the location of additional 
sources of evidence (Turvey, 2011a).  
Two previous studies explored the ways in which 
BEA can be applied to the DF investigation process 
in IIOC and cyberstalking cases, and identified its 
additional contribution to these investigations (Al 
Mutawa et al., 2015, 2016). They forensically 
analysed real cases obtained from Police archives, 
applying the four stages of BEA. The studies 
identified five benefits: (1) providing investigative 
focus, speed and direction, (2) inferring 
victim/offender behaviour, (3) inferring offender 
motivation(s), (4) identifying potential victims, and 
(5) eliminating suspects. They provided a foundation 
for customisation of a DF investigation model that 
incorporates BEA, which is proposed in this paper. 
3. Related Work 
Dozens of DF process models have been 
proposed, developed and refined during the last 
twenty years. A review of eleven popular models 
developed between 2001 and 2016 (Ademu et al., 
2011, Agarwal et al., 2011, Beebe and Clark, 2005, 
Carrier and Spafford, 2003, Cohen, 2010, Holder et 
al., 2001, Kohn et al., 2013, Mir et al., 2016, 
Montasari et al., 2015, Reith et al., 2002, Valjarevic 
and Venter, 2012) showed that many were single 
tiered, and focused on the higher levels of the 
investigative process without providing much detail 
of their underpinning principles. Several authors of 
these models have suggested that additional specific 
steps within each phase (e.g., providing clearer 
definitions of what constitutes the phase, identifying 
the objectives of each phase, providing guiding steps 
on how to conduct each phase) are needed to provide 
adequate detail in order for them to be useful to the 
digital forensic investigator (Carrier and Spafford, 
2003, Mir et al., 2016, Montasari et al., 2015, Palmer, 
2001, Reith et al., 2002). 
Another identified limitation of previous models 
was their lack of consideration of the human 
behavioural and motivational factors that have 
relevance for identifying potential evidence during 
the investigation process. A review of the models 
suggested that the authors have mainly focused on 
the technical aspects of the DF investigation process 
(e.g., data acquisition, preservation of volatile data).  
Section 3.1 examines two models that have 
specifically attempted to integrate BEA within the 
DF investigation process.  
3.1. Integrating BEA in Digital Forensics 
Investigation Models 
Two published models that have incorporated 
aspects of BEA within the DF investigation of digital 
crimes are: (1) Digital Forensics Profiling 
Methodology for Cyberstalkers (Slide & 
Angelopoulou, 2014), and (2) the Behavioural 
Analysis Model (Rogers, 2015). Sections 3.1.1 and 
3.1.2 review these models respectively. 














Silde and Angelopoulou (2014) developed a 
cyberstalker profiling methodology which 
incorporated BEA elements into a standard DF 
investigation framework. Their model consisted of 
three main phases: (1) discovery/accusation, (2) 
examination, and (3) analysis. Each phase included a 
number of investigative processes (e.g., search and 
collection, recovery, harvesting) and profiling stages 
(e.g., equivocal forensics analysis, victimology). The 
model also included specific details that described 
input (e.g., offender skill level, modus operandi 
(MO)) and output (e.g., evidence location, anti-
forensics) within each stage.  
To evaluate the model, the authors simulated the 
behaviour of a cyberstalker and a victim. A pre-
selected set of behaviours was simulated on two 
virtual machines that represented both parties. This 
focused mainly on email communications, instant 
messaging conversations, social networking 
activities, some basic anti-forensics techniques, web 
surfing, and search queries. The investigation focused 
on identifying the location of evidence on both the 
victim and the offender’s machines. It provided 
minimum detail about victim or offender behaviour, 
probably due to the fact that it was tested using a 
simulation that provided limited offender and victim 
activities. 
 Silde and Angelopoulou (2014) recognised BEA 
mainly as an instrument of triage (i.e., a way to focus 
DF investigations on locations that are more likely to 
contain relevant evidence). The authors focused on 
the technical phase of the methodology by using 
digital evidence (e.g., use of specific anti-forensics 
tools, communication files) to guide the search and
recovery of evidence. They referred to the use of 
BEA stages in conducting the investigation, but did
not offer any guidelines on how to conduct these 
stages within the different phases of the 
methodology. They also touched on offender 
motivations, MO and skill, yet did not provide 
sufficient practical guidance on how to establish this 
information.  
The evaluation methodology used in this study 
was not sufficiently robust to assess the applicability 
and utility of the proposed model. Since simulation of 
a predefined set of cyberstalking activities were us d, 
the researchers were already aware of the evidence to 
look for during the examination and analysis of the
victim and offender’s machines. As such, this is not 
fully sufficient to show how using the model, for 
example, can provide investigative direction. Also, 
the simulation did not include enough realistic 
information to illustrate offender characteristics (e.g., 
motivations, intent), which helps better understand 
aspects of a case. In summary, they did not use real 
cases for evaluating their model. Further tests using 
existing cases and related digital evidence are needed 
to better evaluate the applicability and utility of the 
model.    
3.1.2. Behavioural Analysis Model 
Rogers (2015) argued that DF places greater 
emphasis on the principles of computer science and 
engineering (e.g., file carving, hash functions), while 
paying less attention to traditional investigative 
approaches. As a result, the investigative process is 
mainly concerned with data collection, with less 
focus on its examination and analysis. He proposed a 
model which incorporated aspects of BEA into the 
process of DF investigation. This included six 
phases: (1) case classification, (2) context analysis, 
(3) data collection, (4) statistical analysis, (5) 
timeline analysis/visualisation, and (6) 
decision/opinion. He provided a brief description of 
each stage, focusing on the statistical analysis and 
timeline analysis/visualization phases.  
Classification refers to identifying the category of 
case under investigation (e.g., fraud, cyberstalking, 
identity theft). Context analysis involves 
understanding the circumstances of the case in order 
to provide insights into the possible locations of 
relevant evidence. During the collection phase, the 
digital investigator works with the behavioural 
analyst to search for, identify and prepare data 
relevant to the case in preparation for analysis and 
interpretation. The statistical analysis phase focuses 
on conducting frequency analysis on the available 
data to assist in identifying and interpreting relevant 
patterns. For example, frequency analysis can be 
performed on files that store data related to the user’s 
online activities (e.g., cache files, web history files) 
to identify patterns related to preferred visited 
webpages, times of visits, and types of 
uploaded/downloaded files. This can then be used to 
create an online behavioural profile of the user. 
Timeline analysis/visualization aims to combine the
results from the frequency analysis phase with their 
associated timestamps (e.g., timestamps of 
downloading specific files, visiting webpages) to 
visualise usage of the computer. This can further 
assist the investigation, for example, by associating 
computer usage at a specific time with a specific 
individual (in cases where the computer has multiple 
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producing the final report, and addresses the 
questions presented at the start of the investigation. In 
this phase, the practitioner utilises all the results from 
the previous phases to suggest the most likely 
reconstruction of the offence events, or the most 
likely characteristics of the offender (in cases of 
unknown offender).  
Rogers (2015) demonstrated the application and 
usability of his model by employing three case 
studies based on real cases from different categoris 
of crimes (i.e., arson, murder, IIOC). However, while 
the model consisted of six phases, this evaluation 
focused mainly on the investigative benefits of two 
phases: (1) frequency analysis, and (2) timeline 
analysis. Finally, the study did not provide sufficient 
guidelines that DF investigators can follow while 
investigating a digital crime. 
The review of previous models indicated an 
increased recognition of the utility of BEA, but 
reflected a limited adoption of its specific strategies 
within the DF investigation process. This highlights 
the need for a more comprehensive BEA-driven 
model that illustrates and clarifies the steps requir d 
in conducting an integrated DF investigation. The 
next section describes the methodology adopted to 
develop the model proposed in this paper.   
4. Methodology for Design of the Proposed Model 
This paper reports the final product of a broader 
programme of multidisciplinary research that 
developed a DF model that incorporates BEA 
strategies. It focused on the post-mortem in-lab 
examination, analysis, and interpretation of digital 
evidence associated with digital crimes. The 
methodology followed is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
The process of developing the proposed model 
involved three main stages. Stage 1 (Figure 1) 
constituted of two empirical studies that employed a 
mixed-methods approach with quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of relevant digital evidence, and 
case documentation. These studies examined the 
utility of BEA during the DF process for two types of 
digital crimes: IIOC (Al Mutawa et al., 2015) and 
cyberstalking (Al Mutawa et al., 2016). These 
specific crime categories were selected for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, there is a relatively small body f 
empirical research on the behaviour and 
characteristics of online IIOC offenders, with an 
emerging body of literature examining their 
demographics and motivations (Babchishin et al., 
2015, Henshaw et al., 2015, McGuire and Dowling, 
2013, Wolak et al., 2008). Secondly, the investigation 
and prosecution of IIOC cases requires more than 
simply locating the abusive imagery on the suspect’s 
digital device. For example, it is necessary to 
demonstrate (using the available digital evidence) 
that the suspect was aware of the download of IIOC 
in order for them to be prosecuted (Akdeniz, 2016, 
Walsh et al., 2013). The use of technology in the 
commission of IIOC offences, however, raises 
significant investigative and evidential challenges 
(e.g., multiple computer users, the increased use of 
strategies to evade detection, claims of unintentional 
download (Balfe et al., 2015, Franqueira et al., 2018, 
Internet Watch Foundation, 2016, Walsh et al., 
2013)). As a result, the theoretical and empirical 
literature on this offence category is still in the early 
stages of development (Houtepen et al., 2014, Taylor, 
2001). To date, none of the existing DF research that 
has incorporated the strategies and principles of BEA 
have been used to empirically investigate cases of 
IIOC. 
Likewise, the crime category of cyberstalking was 
selected for the second part of Stage 1 for a number 
of reasons. The use of advanced technologies to 
commit this offence also raises specific investigative 
and evidential challenges (Brown, 2015, Fusco, 
2014). In this crime category, digital evidence and 
artefacts do not reside on a single electronic medium, 
but are scattered across several platforms (e.g., 
offender/victim devices and within the online 
environment) (Aggarwal et al., 2005, Bryce et al., 
2016). Also, despite the serious harm that it can cause 
(e.g., inflicting emotional distress, physical harm, 
murder, suicide), it remains an under-prosecuted 
offence (Vasiu and Vasiu, 2016).  
Behaviour associated with IIOC and cyberstalking 
crime categories generates specific forms of evidence 
which can be extracted from digital devices during 
the investigative process. This evidence can then be 
analysed using BEA in order to build a specific 
profile of offenders to determine the motivations 
associated with their behaviour, their relationship 













with the victim(s), and the interpretation of digital 
evidence (Al Mutawa et al., 2015, 2016). 
The selection of cases utilised criterion sampling 
(Patton, 2001), with inclusion based on offender 
behaviour which met the legal definition of IIOC and 
cyberstalking, use of a computer as the main 
offending platform, the availability of image files, 
and the availability of interview scripts with 
offenders/victims. For each type of crime, a selection 
of archived cases (15 IIOC and 20 cyberstalking 
cases) were obtained from the Dubai Police. The 
crimes were committed in Dubai between 2009 and 
2013. Offenders were arrested, however, the police 
documents did not include information on whether 
they were subsequently convicted. Since similar 
technology is used for committing these crimes 
internationally, it is fair to say that the selected cases 
would be generalisable to other agencies worldwide. 
We are not aware of any additional non-technological 
factors in the selected cases which would make them 
unique to the UAE or otherwise not generalisable. 
Each case was examined and analysed 
individually using the standard DF procedure (Casey, 
2002), and the four strategies of BEA (equivocal 
evidence analysis, victimology, crime scene 
characteristics, and offender characteristics). The 
examination produced qualitative data that was 
processed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 
2006) (e.g., offender motivations reflected by the 
digital evidence). All case related documents (e.g., 
background of offence, interview scripts) were also 
analysed using descriptive statistics to provide 
demographic data about offenders and victims, and 
the involved offending behaviours. The two studies 
assisted in the development of empirical evidence 
indicating the usability and utility of incorporating 
BEA into the investigated cases. It also identified the 
potential limitations of such an approach.  
Along with the review of process models which 
incorporate BEA reviewed in Section 3.1, this 
examination helped to identify the necessary 
structure to design a model that will aid DF 
investigators to perform each step of the examinatio , 
analysis, and interpretation of digital evidence to 
achieve reliable results. 
Stage 2 of the model development (Figure 1) 
focused on design, and incorporated BEA strategies 
based on input from Stage 1. The final phase, Stage 3 
(Figure 1), employed a case study approach to 
evaluate and illustrate the investigative importance 
and utility of the model. Five interpersonal crime 
cases obtained from the Dubai Police archive were 
used. The selection of cases utilised a criterion 
sampling (Patton, 2001) with inclusion based on the 
following criteria: (1) offender behaviour which met 
the definition of interpersonal crimes, (2) use of a 
computer as the main offending platform, (3) the 
availability of image files, and (4) the availability of 
interview scripts with offenders/victims. The cases 
were crimes committed in Dubai between 2009 and 
2013.  
The researchers used the phases and sub-phases of 
the developed model and described how each of them 
was conducted in relation to the investigation of each 
case. A case study strategy (Bryman, 2015, Hancock 
and Algozzine, 2015) was employed to provide a 
descriptive, in-depth analysis of each case, and 
provide a clear step by step guide on how to apply the 
different phases and sub-phases of the model. 
However, only one case study is reported in this 
paper due to space limitations. This involved 
impersonation and defamation on Facebook. This 
specific case was selected as it represents a typical 
interpersonal digital crime and level of complexity 
(involving three types of criminal conduct as 
described later in Section 6.1) without overwhelming 
the reader with too much detail.  
Also part of Stage 3 (Figure 1) was a reflection of 
lessons learned in terms of: (1) how the application of 
the model contributed to the investigation of the case, 
and (2) how the results of the conducted examinatio 
with the proposed model compared to results from 
the original cases report.  
5. The Behavioural Digital Forensics Investigation 
Model 
This section proposes a DF investigation model 
that incorporates aspects of BEA. It aims to provide a 
pragmatic, structured, multidisciplinary approach to 
performing a post mortem examination, analysis, and 
interpretation of the content of the digital devices 
associated with digital crimes. The model adheres to 
commonly used DF process principles (i.e., 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) (Ieong, 
2006).  
The proposed four-stage model was designed 
using a high-level categorisation in order to enable 
generalisation across different types of digital 
interpersonal crimes. It is presented in a linear format 
in order to provide a clear overview of the phases and 
sub-phases of the investigation. However, in practice, 
the investigative process is dynamic and iterative. 
New evidence about the victim, offender, and 












ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT   
of an investigation. This can raise new questions, a d 
require the re-investigation of previous stages (e.g., 
search for additional evidence or information, re-
examination of specific data, reinterpretation of 
evidence).  
The design of the model is based on empirical, 
practical testing of the investigative utility of BEA on 
real IIOC and cyberstalking cases, as mentioned in 
Section 4. The phases and sub-phases of the model 
were also derived from Roger’s behavioural analysis 
model (2015), and the DF profiling methodology for 
cyberstalking proposed by Silde and Angelopoulou 
(2014) reviewed in Section 3.1. These models were 
selected because they encompass relevant aspects of 
BEA, though they are not necessarily explicitly 
described.  
The model does not describe the acquisition and 
validation of the content of the seized electronic 
devices. This process is already well developed, with
practical guidelines available (e.g., ACPO guidelines 
in the UK (Williams, 2012)), therefore, it is deemed 
not relevant to the BEA-driven model. For the sake 
of the discussion, it is assumed that that forensically-
sound images of electronic devices have already been
acquired.  
The model has four phases: (1) review, (2) 
recognition and collection, (3) examination and 
analysis, and (4) interpretation and reporting. The 
phases which involve BEA are the r view phase and 
the examination and analysis phase. The review 
phase has three BEA-related sub-phases: context, 
classification, and prioritisation. The examination and 
analysis phase consists of two BEA-related sub-
phases: content analysis, as well as timeline analysis 
and mapping. Figure 2 presents a visual 
representation of the model with a breakdown of 
these two phases.  
Sections 5.1-5.4 provide a discussion of the 
primary phases and the sub-phases of the proposed 
model, and describe the key tasks in each phase.  
5.1. Phase 1: Review 
The initial phase is derived from the Threshold 
Assessment process described by Turvey (2011b). 
This involves a review of the currently available 
evidence and the established case facts relevant to the 
crime related behaviour and victimology. It also 
examines potential offender motivations, behaviour 
and characteristics, as well as crime scene 
characteristics. It aims to provide immediate 
investigative direction, and assist the investigator to 
develop an initial overview of the case and the 
involved parties. It also aims to draw initial insights 
into the offender’s risk in order to take immediate 
actions if required. It does not involve a full analysis 
of the case-related digital devices. The outcome of 
this phase enables the investigator to prepare a 
strategy for the investigation (e.g., design a specific 
search criterion, form a specific hypothesis). Sub-
phases are described in Sections 5.1.1-5.1.3. 
5.1.1. Context 
It is essential to understand the context of the case 
prior to examining and analysing the associated 
evidence. The investigator should perform a careful 
review of all the available case documents. This 
includes information about the case, related 
background and the people involved. Demographic 
details and descriptions of the suspect(s) and 
victim(s) (when known) must be noted (e.g., age, 
gender, ethnicity, employment status, marital statu, 
qualification, and computer literacy). Other 
information about specific offender characteristics 
(e.g., history of assaultive behaviour, criminal record, 
and psychiatric history) should also be identified and 
included. This can assist the investigator to determine 
offender risk (e.g., escalating from cyberstalking to 
physical stalking, or acting upon threats made). It 
also enables the investigator to determine the 
technical skill level of the offender and the possibility 
of facing anti-forensic techniques when examining 
and analysing the associated digital evidence (Casey, 
2011a).  
Interview scripts with victims and offenders, and 
victim statements must also be reviewed. The 
investigator can compare this information to the 
results of the analysis of the digital evidence in the
later stages of the investigation. This enables them to 
confirm or refute offender and/or victim statements. 













All assumptions and interpretations from other 
practitioners involved in investigating the case must 
also be considered. This enables the investigator to 
contextualise the case and develop an initial 
understanding of the events surrounding the incident 
(Casey and Turvey, 2011). It also provides them with 
an initial profile of the offender which can inform the 
later stages of the investigation (Casey and Turvey, 
2011). 
5.1.2. Classification 
This stage consists of three types of classification: 
case classification, victim classification, and offender 
classification. After understanding the context of the
case, the investigator can classify the case category 
and determine its initial level of complexity. 
Different types of cases (e.g., IIOC, cyberstalking, 
fraud, extortion) have unique characteristics and 
dynamics. However, cases within the same crime 
category also differ from one another in technical and 
behavioural aspects (e.g., level of complexity, 
technique, number of suspects, offender motivations). 
As such, classifying the case based on the available 
information enables the investigator to plan a strategy 
for the examination and analysis phase. This is 
further informed by the prioritisation sub-phase 
discussed in Section 5.1.3.    
Building a preliminary profile of the victim 
(forensic victimology) is also an important step in 
answering case questions. This process involves the 
use of a scientific method to examine and interpret 
specific victim related evidence in order to answer 
investigative questions (Turvey and Freeman, 2011). 
It also assesses victim exposure (risk assessment), 
examining how specific factors may have 
contributed/increased the victim’s contact with the 
offender and subsequent harm (Casey, 2011a, Turvey 
and Freeman, 2011). The profile includes information 
such as the victim’s demographics, technical skills 
and physical characteristics, as well as their lifestyl  
and behavioural characteristics. This assessment 
enables the investigator to determine factors which 
provided opportunities for victimisation, and to 
identify the relationship between the victim and the 
offender (Casey, 2011a). As such, understanding the 
victim is an initial step for understanding the offender 
and their motivations. In many cases, victim 
statements and interviews have gaps and loopholes, 
and do not provide a complete picture of the incident 
(Fisher et al., 1989, Geiselman and Fisher, 2014). 
The investigator needs to use evidence gathered from 
the associated digital devices in order to fill these 
gaps and develop a more detailed understanding of 
the incident. They also need to weigh the conflicting 
and shifting accounts of the incident in order to 
decipher what really happened. As such, the 
investigator can start by building an initial profile of 
the victim (based on information from the case 
documents), which can then be cross examined with 
results from the analysis of the associated digital 
evidence, and be updated at later stages of the 
investigation.  
Classifying the offender is also an important step 
for planning a strategy for investigating the case. 
Based on the information collected in the Context 
sub-phase, the investigator can construct an initial 
profile of the offender. This can include their 
demographic characteristics, technical skill level, and 
suspected motivations. Risk assessment instruments 
(e.g., RAGE-V (Association of Threat Assessment 
Professionals, 2006), Static-2002 (Hanson and 
Thornton, 2003)) can also be utilised to gather 
information on the suspect, and measure the potential 
risk that they may pose for further offending. The us  
of such tools can facilitate both inductive and 
deductive analysis, allowing the investigator to 
correlate suspect personal traits and characteristics 
with those of known offenders. The combined 
inductive and deductive techniques strengthen the 
results of the analysis, which can further assist the 
investigation by guiding the case planning. However, 
these tools should be used with caution, considering 
the applicability of the specific tool to the case under 
investigation.   
At this point, the investigator should develop 
initial criteria for the relevant potential evidence to 
identify when examining the digital devices 
associated with the case.  
5.1.3. Prioritisation 
This sub-phase deals directly with the digital 
devices associated with the case. At this point, the 
investigator will perform a quick preview of the 
contents of the seized devices. The aim of this sub-
phase is to provide an insight on which device(s) 
contain potentially relevant evidence in cases were 
more than one device were seized and brought to the 
lab for examination. It also provides insights which 
can enable the identification of the potential location 
of evidence on each device based on the criteria 
developed in the preceding sub-phases. This allows 
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As time and data volume are two of the main 
constraining factors in DF investigations (Guarino, 
2013, Lillis et al., 2016, Noblett et al., 2000), this 
sub-phase helps the investigator to prioritise the 
devices under investigation, determine a starting 
point for examination and analysis, and develop an 
examination plan (e.g., prioritise search goals). This 
can reduce the amount of time wasted in performing 
an unstructured examination of a huge number of 
potentially relevant files.  
5.2. Phase 2: Recognition and Collection 
An essential step when starting the investigation 
of the digital devices seized is to identify the 
authorship of the evidence files and artefacts stored 
in them (Chaski, 2005, Rocha et al., 2017, Rogers, 
2015). Unless it is ascertained that only a single 
individual had access to the device under 
investigation, the investigator must establish a 
verifiable link between the incriminating files and a 
potential suspect. A computer system can have more 
than one user profile, with each profile being 
accessed by a different individual. Furthermore, in 
some cases, a single profile is shared by more than 
one individual. The examiner must also consider the 
possibility that suspected offenders might be, in fact, 
victims themselves, and that their devices might have 
been accessed and misused by the real offenders 
(e.g., hacked and accessed remotely, real offender 
knows the password and has physical access to the 
device). Depending on the complexity of the case, th  
investigator might have to use a combination of 
techniques in order to recognise and collect the 
required evidence files and artefacts (e.g., corroborate 
timestamps of the files with the suspect’s real time 
use of the computer, check for viruses or software 
that enable remote access to the computer, conduct 
analysis of distinguishable language in written 
communications and online activities) (Chaski, 2005, 
Nirkhi and Dharaskar, 2013, Rashid et al., 2013, 
Rocha et al., 2017, Shavers, 2013). A number of 
emerging techniques that have potential for aiding 
with author attribution includes keystroke mouse-
movement analysis, email behaviour, computer usage 
behaviour, credit card use, and game strategy (Feher 
et al., 2012, Gupta and Rogers, 2016, Mondal and 
Bours, 2016, Yampolskiy and Govindaraju, 2008).  
It is also worth noting that, in some cases, 
determining the author of the evidence files and 
artefacts can be very challenging (Shavers, 2013), or 
cannot be accomplished at all.  
Once the investigator positively recognises 
evidence files, they should then be collected and 
sorted in a way that will enable a focused and 
structured examination and analysis which are the 
next phase.   
5.3. Phase 3: Examination and Analysis 
This phase involves examining and analysing the 
collected data to produce information that can answer 
questions associated with investigating the case, and 
confirm or refute associated hypotheses. It consists of 
two sub-phases: content analysis and timeline 
analysis, described in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
5.3.1. Content Analysis 
In digital crimes, many of the digital files and 
artefacts on a subject’s digital device reflect the 
behaviour of the person who created those files (i.., 
the suspect or the victim). Their careful examination 
can help the practitioner to identify evidence that c n 
be attributed to a specific suspect, understand the 
relationship between an identified suspect and a 
victim, identify the predominant motivation of the 
offender, and understand the context in which the 
incident occurred. As such, this sub-phase involves 
performing qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
the material stored within the digital files and 
artefacts. Two types of content analysis can specially 
bring benefits to the investigation of digital crimes: 
frequency analysis and language analysis. 
As most digital crimes involve the online activities 
of suspects and victims, it is essential to analyse the 
different behaviour that are reflected by these 
activities. For example, in IIOC cases, a frequency 
analysis of the visited websites, downloaded files, 
search history, and cache files can provide various 
investigative leads (Al Mutawa et al., 2015). It can 
also help the practitioner to identify the periods of 
high online activities and/or computer usage, 
frequently visited web sites and downloaded/traded 
files (Rogers, 2015, Rogers and Seigfried-Spellar, 
2014). Furthermore, the volume of indecent images 
and videos on the suspect’s computer, the frequency 
of IIOC-related search queries and related visited 
web sites can be of significant investigative utility 
(Al Mutawa et al., 2015). These factors can provide 
sufficient evidence that the user intentionally sought 
out IIOC and exercised control over them (Al 
Mutawa et al., 2015).  
Language analysis involves examining and 
analysing the content of written communications 













interpersonal crimes involve written communication 
between suspects and victims, this information can be 
invaluable for the investigation. For example, many 
cyberstalkers express (through written 
communication) their inner emotions (e.g., rage, 
love) that led them to cyberstalk their victims (Al 
Mutawa et al., 2016). This can provide the 
practitioner with an indication of the motivation 
behind the offender’s behaviour. Using a specific 
writing style and vocabulary can also be a significant 
psychological indicators of the emotional state of the
offender (Hancock et al., 2013). It can also reflect the 
potential risk they pose to the victim. In cases of 
multiple suspects, the writing style and language can 
be distinctive enough to differentiate between them. 
Repetition of certain linguistic errors and the frequ nt 
use of specific words or phrases can be linked to a
specific suspect. Further, assessing the written dialect 
can assist in profiling the author in terms of native 
language, age, gender, and educational level (Chaski, 
2012).  Language analysis can also reflect the traits 
and behaviour that contributed to the victim being 
targeted by the offender. A treatise on language 
analysis in assisting digital investigations is beyond 
the scope of this work, however, two practical 
examples of  work on this subject were performed by 
Shaw (2006) and Grant (2012). Extensive work in 
this area includes that of McMenamin (2002) and 
Coulthard et al. (2016). Other emerging methods that 
have potential to be used for author attribution 
include keystroke and mouse-movement analysis, 
computer usage behaviour profiling, email behaviour, 
online game strategy, and credit card use (Feher et 
al., 2012, Gupta and Rogers, 2016, Mondal and 
Bours, 2016, Yampolskiy and Govindaraju, 2008).   
Since each case has its unique set of 
characteristics and details, it is essential for the 
practitioner to customise the content analysis 
undertaken in accordance with the specific 
characteristics of the case.  
5.3.2. Timeline Analysis & Mapping 
This sub-phase involves analysing the timestamps 
associated with the files in question (see Section 5.2) 
and cross examining them with the timeframe in 
which the crime events occurred (Rogers, 2015). An 
essential step after collecting the related digital 
evidence is to make sense of them by organising 
them chronologically. Whenever possible, the 
investigator must examine the date and time-based 
information associated with the evidence files and 
map them onto other timestamps collected in the 
previous phases (e.g., from background story, victim 
interview). Files can be sorted, grouped, or filtered to 
generate a representative dataset that aids in the 
interpretation and reconstruction of the events of the 
crime. Such a dataset can also provide a better 
overview of the activities involving the suspect and 
victim, and reduce confusion in understanding the 
order of the events. It can also provide a timeframe of 
activities that can confirm or refute the claims of the 
victim/offender. In cases where more than one 
suspect had access to the same user account, 
producing a timeframe of user activity combined with 
other forms of content analysis which can be 
compared to users’ real time activities can be used to 
eliminate suspects, and determine the probable 
offender (Rogers, 2015). Analysing the variation in a 
file’s timestamp (i.e., created, accessed, modified) 
can indicate users’ behaviour towards the file, and 
whether they had misused it. For example, if the 
timestamp of file creation precedes the timestamp of 
modification can indicate the user had altered the file. 
As such, timestamp analysis will be a significant part 
of the investigation in many cases. 
5.3.3. Phase 4: Interpretation and Reporting 
In the final stage of the investigation, the 
practitioner attempts to define and contextualise all 
the events that took place during the course of the 
crime in order to answer the associated investigative 
questions. At this stage, it is especially important for 
the practitioner to stay objective and consider all the 
different possibilities and interpretations of the 
combined analysed evidence and timeframes. They 
would establish the timeline of events and attempt to 
reconstruct the crime based on the evidence collected 
and analysed during the previous phases. This would 
then be used to build the report to the requesting 
party. 
6. Evaluation of the Proposed Model 
This section presents a case study related to 
impersonation and defamation on Facebook (from a 
pool of 5 cases used for the evaluation of the 
proposed model, as mentioned in Section 4). This 
case illustrates the application and utility of the 
model depicted in Figure 2 for the DF processing of 
evidence. The criteria used for selection of cases ar  
also described in Section 4.  
The evaluation follows a report format strictly 
based on the phases and sub-phases of the proposed 
model (see Figure 2). Note that the model provides 
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required for the investigation of each specific case. 
The following is a sample of a report outline based 
on the proposed DF process model: 
• Case background 
• Review of case documents 
o Context 
o Classification (includes case, victim(s), 
offender(s) classifications) 
o Prioritisation of devices to be examined 
• Recognition and collection of evidence 
• Examinations and analysis performed 
o Content Analysis (includes frequency 
analysis and language analysis) 
o Timeline Analysis and Mapping 
• Findings and interpretations 
It is important to note that the researchers did not 
review the original report that included the result of 
examination and analysis of the case prior to 
conducting the DF investigation. This was to ensure 
that the investigation process using the model was 
not influenced or guided by the original results from 
the case documents. As such, the original results 
were only reviewed after the researchers concluded 
the case analysis in order to compare the findings. 
Section 6.1 elaborates on the use of the proposed 
model.  
6.1. Impersonation and Defamation on Facebook 
case study – (Case Background) 
The case involved different types of criminal 
conduct: (1) theft of user login credentials, (2) online 
impersonation of a user through Facebook, and (3) 
harassment via online defamation and slander. A 
female (Miss X) filed a complaint at a local police 
station that she had been impersonated and defamed 
through her Facebook account. She stated that her 
account was hacked and used to post offensive 
information on her profile page (Facebook/Education 
and Work section) during the month of July 2010. 
She did not suspect anyone in particular. Initial 
investigation conducted by the Cyber Police Section 
at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), of 
which the details were not provided in the case 
documents, traced the origin of the activity to an 
Internet account that belonged to a male suspect (Mr 
Y). Mr Y was requested to attend for interrogation. 
During the interview, Mr Y denied the accusations 
and claimed not to have any previous knowledge of 
Miss X. A search warrant was issued to search Mr 
Y’s residence where three laptops were seized for 
post-mortem examination. Two of the laptops had a 
sticker with “Mr Y” handwritten on them, while the 
third had the name of Mr Y’s spouse on it. The case 
request letter asked to examine the seized laptops to 
identify whether they had been used to login to Miss 
X’s Facebook account and post the defamatory 
information.  
It is important to note that all of the case 
documents, interview scripts, and the posted 
defamatory information were in Arabic. Information 
necessary for the case study was translated into 
English by the main researcher. Also, to conceal the 
identities of the involved parties, pseudonyms have 
been used for the victim, suspect, spouse of the 
suspect, and locations. The researchers have obscured 
profanity throughout this section. The remaining of 
this section provides a walk-through of the 
investigation using the proposed model.   
6.1.1. Phase 1: Review 
As illustrated in the DF Behavioural Model (see 
Figure 2), the first phase has three sub-phases: 
context, classification, and prioritization. 
6.1.1.1. Context 
This sub-phase involves a careful study of all the 
related case documents. The main researcher 
collected information on the victim (Miss X), suspect 
(Mr Y), and the offence. Miss X’s statements and 
interview scripts revealed a number of interesting 
pieces of information. She was a single woman from 
the Middle East, aged 32, who lived in an apartment 
with a (female) roommate. She worked in a private 
sector company and shared an office with two other 
individuals (also females). Her working hours were 
from 9:00am to 5:00pm. She had been working in the 
company for 3 years and was recently promoted to a 
higher position. When asked if she used her office 
workstation to access her personal accounts, her 
answer was positive. She used to check her personal 
email and Facebook accounts during her lunch break. 
Her workstation was password protected, yet, she 
admitted that she would sometimes leave it unlocked 
if she needed to leave the office for a short time 
(without specifying the exact length of time). She 
also stated that there were a number of instances 
where her office colleagues had used her workstation 
through her user account. According to her, she did 
not have any reason to suspect any specific 
individual. Miss X said that she shared a single 
laptop with her roommate using the same user 
account. Further, she claimed not to have previous 













The case documents provided little information 
about Mr Y. In his interview script, Mr Y claimed not 
to have any involvement in the incident. He was a 39 
years old male who worked in a different private 
sector company to that of Miss X. He lived with his
spouse in an apartment, and had no children. Both he 
and his spouse had their own laptops, and did not 
share or use each other’s devices. He claimed not to 
have any previous knowledge of Miss X, nor her 
Facebook and email accounts. The case documents 
also included information related to Miss X’s office 
colleagues and roommate, which was gathered during 
the initial investigation by the CID. This included 
their names and details of their email accounts. 
The case documents included the email account 
that Miss X used to access her Facebook account, and 
a copy of her Facebook page that was altered and 
used to post the defamatory information. Figure 3 
shows the Facebook page in question. Note that all 
identifying information was blurred by the main 




The copy of the altered Facebook page was 
examined and all information that was thought to be 
relevant to the investigation was noted (e.g., 
Facebook profile ID, defamed Miss X’s name on the 
page, defamatory information). Miss X’s original 
profile name was altered to Miss X the Frog. The 
defamatory information published on the Education 
and Work section was: 
Employers Houses of prostitution and 
nightclubs in (Z City). 
College  (Country B) country of prostitution 
and wh@$ing. 
High School School of bit@$ing and wh@$ing.  
6.1.1.2. Classification 
Initially, the incident was categorised as an 
interpersonal offence that constituted at three typs of 
criminal conduct (see beginning of Section 6.1). The 
fact that three individuals (Miss X’s roommate, and 
her two work colleagues) were usually within close 
range to Miss X, and had physical access to 
computers belonging to her, led to the presumption 
that the MO of stealing her user login credentials 
could have been performed with relative ease. Based 
on this possibility, it was hypothesised that one of 
them was involved in the offence. As such, after 
gaining access to Miss X’s Facebook account, 
impersonation and publication of the defamatory 
information could have been performed with 
minimum difficulty. This was unless measures were 
taken by the offender to hide the evidence of their 
criminal activity. 
The daily activities of Miss X had created 
opportunities for victimisation. For example, she had 
been logging into her personal accounts using her 
office workstation. If she was, for example, targeted 
by an individual working in the Network Department, 
it would have been relatively easy to intercept her
network traffic and steal her login credentials. 
Leaving her workstation unlocked, even for few 
minutes, would also put her at risk of victimisation. A 
few minutes is enough time to install a keylogger or 
monitoring software on a computer. Sharing her 
computer with others also increased the potential of 
being victimised. The following are quotes from her 
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interview script that have been transcribed into 
English. The quotes show some of Miss X’s activities 
that might have increased her risk of victimisation: 
I check my Facebook and my personal 
email every day, usually during my 
break time. 
I use my office workstation to check my 
personal email and Facebook. 
Yes, I do leave the office sometimes 
without locking my workstation, but it’s 
usually for a few minutes, when I go to 
the washing room, or go grab a cup of 
coffee. 
My office colleagues used my 
workstation a number of times. I was in 
the office at the time though. 
My relation with my office colleagues 
is only through work. It’s not like we 
are friends. 
My roommate and I share the same 
laptop, same user account. We are 
close friends. 
The case documents and interview scripts did not 
provide enough information to predict a motivation 
for the initial suspect (Mr Y). However, one possible 
motivation could have been a prior, but undisclosed, 
relationship between Mr Y and Miss X that neither 
were admitting. No further assumptions could be 
made about Mr Y before an initial examination was 
performed on the seized laptops. 
The information collected in this phase enabled 
the generation of three hypotheses in relation to wh
could have committed the offence: (1) Mr Y, (2) one 
of Miss X’s office colleagues, or (3) Miss X’s 
roommate.  
The first hypothesis was based on the fact that the 
investigation conducted by the CID had identified Mr 
Y as an initial suspect. It was also based on the 
possibility of Mr Y not being truthful in his interview 
statements in relation to his involvement in the 
offence, and his knowledge of Miss X.  
The second hypothesis was that one of Miss X’s 
office colleagues was linked to the incident. This was 
based on the fact that they had accessed her 
workstation a number of times, which provided a 
means to steal her Facebook credentials (e.g., 
observed Miss X while typing the password, used a 
keylogger). One possible motivation in this case was 
jealousy or anger associated with Miss X’s 
promotion.  
The third hypothesis was that Miss X’s roommate 
was involved in the incident based on the fact that
they shared the same computer and user account. 
However, there was not enough information to 
suggest a possible motivation for her involvement. 
Despite forming the previous hypotheses, other 
possibilities were also considered (e.g., the spouse of 
Mr Y being involved in the incident, Miss X herself 
trying to incriminate someone). However, the data 
available at this stage lacked information that 
supported the formation of these last two hypotheses. 
Confirming or refuting the generated hypotheses 
would require analysis of the evidence from the 
seized digital devices. The generation of new 
hypotheses was based on the next stages of the 
investigation. 
6.1.1.3. Prioritisation 
In order to prioritise the laptops seized, a quick 
string search was performed on specific locations o 
each device that were more likely to contain evidence 
related to the incident (e.g., Internet history folders, 
Unallocated Clusters). Unique words and phrases on 
Miss X’s defamed Facebook page (see Figure 3) 
were used to perform the search (e.g., Miss X’s 
Facebook profile ID number, email ID, defamed 
name of Miss X). A decision was made to begin the 
examination and analysis with the laptop that started 
showing positive search hits. Interestingly, and 
unexpectedly, positive hits started to appear on the 
laptop belonging to the spouse of Mr Y (Mrs Y). 
6.1.2. Phase 2: Recognition and Collection 
This phase started by identifying user accounts on 
the laptop. There was one user account, which was 
password-protected and had the same name as Mrs Y. 
Performing a full string search resulted in 349 hits on 
Miss X’s email account, 407 hits on Miss X’s 
Facebook ID number, and 385 hits on Miss X’s 
name. The first round of string searches, however, 
resulted in zero hits on the defamatory phrases 
published on Miss X’s Facebook page. The 
characters of Arabic phrases were converted into 
Unicode escape characters, and a second search 













(Al Mutawa et al., 2011). The search session resultd 
in 3 and 4 hits on two of the insulting phrases posted 
on Miss X’s Facebook page. All the files that 
contained the search hits were selected and sorted to 
be further examined and analysed. 
6.1.3. Phase 3: Examination and Analysis 
The results indicated that the majority of the 
search hits on Miss X’s Facebook profile ID were in 
a specific index.dat file (i.e., a database file usd by 
the Internet Explorer web browser to store 
information on user Internet activity such as visited 
web URLs, and timestamps of access). The specific 
index.dat file that included the hits was stored in the 
location: ..\Users\(Mrs 
Y)\AppData\Local\Microsoft\ 
Windows\History\History.IE5\index.dat. The file 
was extracted and the Index.dat Analyzer software 
was used to further analyse its contents. The file 
contained 1329 entries from which 376 were 
associated with Miss X’s Facebook page. Entries 
showed that the user had logged into the Facebook 
account of Miss X and visited pages that enabled 
editing its contents (e.g., Miss X’s profile and 
album). The entries also showed that the user had 
entered the editing page for the Education and Work 
(i.e., the page that was defamed). Analysis of the 
timestamps associated with the entries showed that 
the user had visited these webpages during the period 
6–20/July/2010. It also showed that the peak time of 
activity was roughly between 11:30pm and 1:30am.       
The other search hits were within fragments of 
source code found in the Unallocated Clusters. 
Analysing parts of the source code also showed that 
the user had logged into the Facebook account of 
Miss X and visited pages that enabled editing its 
contents (e.g., Miss X’s profile and album). 
Likewise, the entries showed that the user had 
entered the editing page for the Education and Work 
(i.e., the page that was defamed). Further 
examination did not show evidence of hacking 
software, keyloggers, or software that enables remot  
monitoring. 
The final step consisted of running a search on the 
email accounts of Miss X’s office colleagues and 
roommate to find if they had any connection with the
user. Results showed 132 hits on the email account of 
one of Miss X’s office colleagues. Analysing the 
contents of the available emails showed a relationship 
between the user and Miss X’s office colleague, 
which could be described as friendship. It included 
casual style correspondence mainly covering 
everyday activities. Some of the emails contained e-
cards, as well as entertaining jokes and pictures. The 
content of the emails exchanged during the two 
month period prior to the incident showed a 
considerable amount of negative comments from 
Miss X’s work colleague aimed towards her body 
weight and her work. It indicated the state of mind 
and feelings of Miss X’s work colleague during that 
period of time (e.g., anger, frustration, envy). The 
following are quotes that were extracted from Miss 
X’s work colleague’s emails and transcribed into 
English: 
I am so short of time, I want to exercise 
at home, but I don’t know.. everything 
is just not working. It infuriates me to 
see my body this way. It makes me eat 
more and do not exercise. 
Now I am moving from one nutritionist 
to another. I have to close my mouth 
but I cannot. 
My schedule is sh@t. Many things are 
happening at work. I try to take it easy, 
but it is still affecting me. 
I am fed up tolerating with all the 
stupid sh@t-heads at work. 
I am losing my talent in presenting my 
work. I do not want them to think that I 
am useless. 
It is very unfair. The stupid bit@$es 
get promoted, while I’m rotting on my 
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Performing a full string search on the two laptops 
belonging to Mr Y did not result in any hits. 
6.1.4. Phase 4: Interpretation and Reporting 
After analysis of the collected data, all the 
possible interpretations of the results were identifi d. 
The user online behaviour and the intense activity on 
Miss X’s Facebook account during the period 6–
20/July/2010 were consistent with the statements 
made by Miss X:  
It happened (the defamation offence) 
sometime during the month of July. I 
tried to log into my account several 
times but couldn’t. That’s when I 
realised that it was compromised. Then 
I saw the published information on my 
page. 
 
As the analysis confirmed, the user had been 
logging into Miss X’s Facebook account, and visiting 
different pages in her profile. It also showed that the 
user had performed editing actions on the Work and 
Education page, yet no evidence was found of the 
specific changes that had been performed. 
Combined with Mr Y’s claims of not having any 
knowledge of Miss X or the offence, and not finding 
any evidence on his laptops, there was a strong 
indication that Mrs Y was the individual behind the 
incident. A question that then arises is how and why
was Mrs Y involved in the offence? A statement 
made by Miss X claimed having no previous relation 
or knowledge of Mrs Y: 
I do not know Mr Y, nor do I know Mrs 
Y. I do not have any previous relation 
or knowledge of them.   
The correspondence found between Mrs Y and the 
Miss X’s office colleague indicated the possibility of 
a second suspect (i.e., Miss X’s work colleague). The
quotes listed above showed that Miss X’s work 
colleague had a level of dissatisfaction and negative 
issues about her body weight and her work. The last 
quote was indicative of her feeling disgruntled for the 
promotion of other employees, even though it did not 
contain any explicit statements related to the incident 
or the victim:  
It is very unfair. The stupid bit@$es 
get promoted, while I’m rotting on my 
seat for almost 5 years now!!  
The interpretation of all the extracted evidence 
resulted in: 
 
1. Refuting the first hypothesis suggesting that Mr Y 
was the suspect. 
2. Refuting the hypothesis that Miss X’s roommate 
was involved in the offence. 
3. Providing supporting evidence for the hypothesis 
that one of Miss X’s office colleagues was 
involved in the offence. 
4. Providing evidence that supported the generation 
of a new hypothesis that Mrs Y was involved in 
the offence. 
5. Providing evidence suggesting that Mrs Y and 
Miss X’s office colleague were co-conspirators, 
with a possible motivation of Miss X’s colleague 
being disgruntled and taking out her rage on 
Miss X. Since they were “friends”, Miss X’s 
office colleague might have provided Mrs Y 
with Miss X’s Facebook login credentials and 
convinced her to perform the misconduct.  
 
The results from this stage would have directed 
the main researcher to request performing further 
investigations to support or refute the newly 
generated hypothesis. This would consist of: (1) 
interrogating Mrs Y and Miss X’s office colleague 
based on the evidence found to against  the content of 
their statements, and (2) examining Miss X’s 
workstation in order to gathering evidence of the MO 
of stealing her Facebook login credentials. However, 
as the case was an archived file, the researcher had to 
use the available evidence 
 and no further investigation was possible. As 
such, confirming or refuting the newly generated 
hypotheses was not possible and the investigation had 
to be ceased at this point. 
7. Discussion 
The case study demonstrated the benefit of the 
combined approach of standard DF and BEA in 
providing interpretative and investigative utility. This 
section discusses these benefits by comparing the 
results in the original case files of the sample case to 
the outcomes of the examination conducted by the 
main researcher using the proposed model. 
For the elaborated case (Section 6), the original 
case file showed that the investigation ceased once 
evidence related to accessing Miss X’s Facebook and 
performing activities were discovered on Mrs Y’s 
laptop. The report listed the same technical 













6.1.3 for full details). This included the 376 entries in 
the index.dat file, the location of the file, and the 
entries showing that access has been gained to Miss 
X’s Facebook account.  
The results section of the original report, however, 
only listed these findings and no attempts were made 
to search for the emails of Miss X’s office colleagues 
or roommate. Also, no opinion or hypothesis was 
provided to explain what might have happened, or to 
comment on a possible motivation. This might be due 
to factors such as: (1) directly following the requst 
letter which only asked to identify whether the seized 
laptops had been used to login to Miss X’s Facebook 
account and post the defamatory information, (2) 
time constraints, and (3) work overload. The original 
investigation might have used some aspects of BEA 
analysis to reach to the final conclusion (e.g., 
timeline analysis). However, this may have been 
performed in an ad-hoc manner, and without the 
investigator being aware of the utility of BEA 
strategies. The involved DF practitioner might have 
relied on their expertise and experience in the field to 
perform the post-mortem examination and analysis of 
the laptops in question.  
The obvious main differences that can be inferred 
from the DF investigation performed by the main 
researcher using the proposed model and the original 
digital investigation performed can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. The original investigation did not prioritise the 
devices. It started with Mr Y’s laptops, and there 
was no indication of any steps performed to triage 
and decide which device to start with. Performing 
the prioritisation step could have reduced the time 
and effort spent on the examination and analysis 
of the devices by eliminating full examination of 
Mr Y’s laptop. Following the described procedure 
took approximately 5 days to finalise the 
examination and analysis of the laptops in 
question which was significantly shorter than the 
13 days taken in the original investigation.  
2. The original investigation did not examine the 
association between Mrs Y and Miss X’s work 
colleagues. It did not investigate other potential 
suspects not explicitly named beforehand. As a 
result, the correspondence between Mrs Y and 
Miss X’s work colleague was not found. In 
comparison, the examination and analysis 
performed in this study went further to investigate 
the relationship between other suspects connected 
to the offence. 
3. The use of the model enabled an open-
minded/multidisciplinary approach to examination 
of offender motivations through hypotheses 
building.   
The proposed model is an investigative tool that 
DF practitioners can utilise for the investigation f 
interpersonal crime cases. The model provided here 
outlines an organised and systematic approach to 
conducting the post-mortem investigation of the 
laptops in question. The Review phase enabled the 
researcher to establish a clear context for the diff rent 
aspects of the incident. The incident was categorised 
in terms of criminal conduct and complexity. The 
victim’s daily routines were assessed to develop 
theories about factors which created opportunities for 
victimisation, and possible offender motivations were 
also considered. This phase also enabled the 
researcher to formulate a number of hypotheses about 
identity of probable suspect(s), independent from 
what was identified on the case request letter. These 
were later confirmed or refuted based on the evidence 
identified in later phases. Prioritising the devices also 
helped to speed up the investigation and reduce 
associated resource allocation. Starting with Mr Y’s 
laptops would have consumed more time and 
exhausted the available resources without providing 
positive results.  
Aside from the results that were consistent with 
those identified in the original investigation report, a 
key outcome of the analysis was the discovery of the 
correspondence from Miss X’s office colleague. The 
interpretation of its content was of high investigaive 
value to the case. It provided the researcher with a 
number of investigative directions: (1) it enabled the
researcher to confirm a connection between Mrs Y 
and Miss X’s office colleague, (2) it identified Miss 
X’s office colleague as a probable second-suspect, 
(3) it provided possible motivation for the offence 
(jealousy and rage). The original investigation might 
have identified this information in other ways (e.g., 
during later interrogation of Mrs Y), however, the 
discovery and interpretation of the emails made this
information available in a shorter time with less 
effort. Having this concrete evidence could have 
provided strategies for interrogations and a means to 
direct the questioning and refute deceptive answers.  
Utilising the proposed model demonstrated similar 
benefits to the other 4 digital interpersonal crime 
cases tested in the original research. All of the cases 
used (i.e., extortion, money forwarding scam, false 
accusation, and employment scam) included digital 
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noting that the proposed model is not intended for the 
investigation of types of digital crimes which invol e 
limited or no human interaction, for instance, those in 
which automated tools are used to commit the crime 
(e.g., malware infection, and denial of service 
attacks). 
8. Limitations 
Whilst the proposed model provides a useful tool 
for the investigation of certain types of digital crimes, 
it is important to recognise that it is not without 
limitations. The potential to use the model is 
influenced by the availability of sufficient case 
information, and of a significant amount of digital 
evidence. The accuracy and detail of the analysis is 
also limited by the accuracy and detail of the 
evidence on which it is based. For example, a poorly 
described case background can result in the 
practitioner gathering very little reliable information 
during the Review phase (for the Context, 
Classification, and Prioritisation stages). Having a 
weak base of reliable case information can also 
influence the later phases of the model as well (i.e., 
Recognition and Collection, Examination and 
Analysis, and Interpretation and Reporting), resulting 
in a misguided and/or unfocussed investigation. On 
the other hand, the behavioural analysis introduced 
within the model will be of greater utility when there 
is a variety of digital evidence that can be used to 
infer the actions of the offenders/victims (e.g., 
written communications, Internet history files). For 
example, the use of anti-forensics techniques by the 
suspect to eliminate traces of their online activities 
and communication with the victim can prevent a 
considerable amount of important data being 
analysed behaviourally. This would limit the utility 
and benefits of using the model. 
Another major limitation is finding an individual 
who is competent in both DF and behavioural 
analysis. To derive the greatest benefit from the 
model, it is essential for the practitioner to be wll 
equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge in 
both disciplines. The practitioner’s critical skills, 
intuition, and judgment can have a high impact on the 
application and outcomes of the model. They must 
utilise their skills and knowledge, and work with 
caution and objectivity to provide the most 
appropriate analysis and interpretation of the 
recovered digital evidence. This indicates the 
importance of training in the relevant disciplines. 
However, there is always the possibility of 
unintentional subjectivity and bias in the 
practitioner’s interpretations. It is also important for 
the practitioner to acknowledge the dynamic and 
flexible nature of the model, and utilise it 
accordingly. The practitioner should have the ability 
to customise the model to the specifics and different 
attributes of the case under investigation. Following 
the model steps literally without considering the 
unique aspects of each case can greatly limit its 
investigative value. 
The previous limitation, however, can be 
addressed by the use of multidisciplinary 
investigative teams, especially for complex cases. 
Such cases would benefit from the technical skills of 
a DF investigator and the analytical skills of a 
behavioural analyst working closely together on the 
investigation of the digital evidence.  
Finally, while the proposed model demonstrated 
utility in investigating the cases on which it was 
tested, it wasn’t possible to clearly identify how it 
differed from the original investigation conducted on 
the cases. Further work is necessary to extend the 
testing of the proposed model with a larger sample of 
cases involving different categories of digital 
interpersonal crimes. Future effort should also be 
focused on determining whether it is possible to 
impose minimum educational and training 
requirements for DF investigators in relation to 
making them better qualified to employ BEA within 
the DF investigation process, such as the proposed 
model. It would also be worth exploring whether the
model could be implemented within the larger DF 
investigation framework. 
9. Conclusion 
This paper proposed and evaluated a model which 
combines existing standard practice in the field of DF 
with strategies of BEA for the technical examination 
of the digital evidence related to a case. Results 
showed that using the proposed model when 
investigating digital crimes of interpersonal nature 
assisted the investigator in a number of ways. It had
the benefit of focusing the investigation, and 
providing logical directions for identifying the 
location of further relevant evidence. This increased 
the effectiveness and efficacy of the investigation. It 
also enabled a better understanding and interpretation 
of victim/offender behaviours (e.g., probable 
offender motivations and modus operandi, amount of 
planning, victim risk factors), which facilitated a
more in depth understanding of the dynamics of the 













identification of suspect’s collaborators, which was 
not identified via the traditional investigation. 
One implication of this work is the ability to show 
practically that BEA can be applied and be of use 
within the DF investigative process for specific 
categories of digital crimes (i.e., interpersonal 
crimes). It has been theorised in the past that the 
different stages of BEA can provide investigative 
value to the DF investigation (Casey and Turvey, 
2011, Rogers, 2015, Turvey, 2011a), however, this 
had not been tested empirically in previous work. It is
hoped that the knowledge gathered in this paper will 
benefit DF investigators and provide insights on how 
BEA can be utilised within the DF investigation 
process. The proposed model should provide 
sufficient guidelines for DF investigators on how to 
practically apply each step within the DF 
investigation process. 
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